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Abstract
Credit boom detection methodologies (such as threshold method) lack robustness as they are
based on univariate detrending analysis and resort to ratios of credit to real activity. I propose a
quantitative indicator to detect atypical behavior of credit from a multivariate system - a mone-
tary VAR. This methodology explicitly accounts for endogenous interactions between credit, asset
prices and real activity and detects atypical credit expansions and contractions in the Euro Area,
Japan and the U.S. robustly and timely. The analysis also proves useful in real time.
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11 Introduction
Credit provision is one of the key determinants of economic growth and prosperity. Credit is
needed for implementing new investment projects and thereby is also often fostering technological
progress, as it provides ﬁnancial resources to the sectors of the economy where they can be most efﬁ-
ciently used. Credit allows households to smooth consumption over the life cycle, thereby increasing
their welfare. Increased access to credit often goes hand-in-hand with ﬁnancial deepening in develop-
ing and emerging markets.
However, all of these beneﬁts materialize only in sustainable credit expansions. Unsustainable
credit expansions or ”bad” credit booms, on the contrary, end up in adverse economic outcomes ac-
companied by asset price bubbles, deterioration of lending standards, overleveraging, and often a bust
ending in a severe recession or a ﬁnancial crisis. Indeed, there is ample empirical evidence show-
ing the link between rapid credit expansions and the occurrence of banking crises (Borio and Lowe,
2002; Bongini et al., 2002). Certainly, not all credit booms end up in severe crises: Mendoza and
Terrones (2008) show that only a third of credit booms in advanced economies were associated with
crisis episodes. Nevertheless, most of the credit booms are costly. After a credit boom, also normal
recessions (not just ﬁnancial or banking crises) are more painful than otherwise (Taylor, 2012). Even
if a severe crisis does not occur, credit booms leave large sectors of the economy overleveraged, ﬁ-
nancial intermediation becomes impaired. Therefore credit booms are good predictors of creditless
recoveries (see Dell’Ariccia et al., 2012). Timely and correct identiﬁcation of credit cycles as well as
understanding of their causes are crucial for developing appropriate policy responses to mitigate the
costs of unsustainable credit expansions.
The identiﬁcation of credit booms in the literature is often based on the threshold methodol-
ogy (see Gourinchas et al., 2001), which deﬁnes credit booms as episodes of particularly rapid credit
growth. According to this approach, credit variable (typically, credit-to-GDP ratio) is decomposed
into trend and cyclical component with a ﬁlter (such as Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter or its versions), and
then large deviations from trend (those surpassing a certain threshold) are considered as excessive
credit and are therefore indications of a credit boom. This approach, however, has drawbacks, which
may lead to erroneous credit boom identiﬁcation.
First of all, the detection of the boom depends on the smoothness of the trend: the closer the trend
follows actual data, the smaller the deviations from the trend and the less booms can be detected. A
change in trend smoothness parameter leads to substantial differences in timing and duration of a
2credit boom (see Mendoza and Terrones, 2008). Furthermore, it is a priori not clear whether the tra-
ditionally chosen smoothness parameters of the HP-ﬁlter that are tailored at business cycle frequency
are also appropriate for detecting phases of ﬁnancial cycles, since the duration of a ﬁnancial cycle is
shown to be substantially longer than the one of the business cycle (15-20 years vs. 8 years). Sec-
ond, although being an intuitive normalization, credit-to-GDP ratio (which is most widely used in
threshold analysis) can send wrong signals by construction: this ratio increases and suggests a credit
”boom” interpretation in situations when GDP is falling, whereas credit is relatively stable or is falling
at a slower pace than GDP. For instance, many of these spurious ”booms” occur in recessions. These
episodes have to be cross-checked and excluded manually. Finally, threshold methodology is uni-
variate in its nature and cannot account for endogenous interactions between credit, real economy,
asset prices, and monetary policy1. As credit booms are general equilibrium phenomena, it appears
reasonable to detect them from a multivariate perspective (see Gourinchas et al., 2001). This paper
proposes an indicator to detect atypical behavior of credit from a multivariate system - a monetary
vector autoregression (VAR).
As will be shown later, multivariate approach makes credit boom detection more robust; the
detection also becomes independent of the detrending technique and the trend smoothing parameter.
Furthermore, it gives credit boom (or bust) episodes an intuitive interpretation. As noted earlier, credit
booms go wrong when they are unsustainable, i.e. credit growth is much more ahead of the income
generation process in the economy. Therefore, eventually, this credit cannot be repaid, causing a wave
of delinquencies and impairing balance sheets of ﬁnancial intermediaries. Actually, the idea of re-
lating credit ﬂows to real activity in identifying ﬁnancial imbalances also lies at the root of ﬁnancial
instability hypothesis by Minsky (1986), who stresses the importance of ﬁnancial versus real factors
linked in ﬁrms’ balance sheets. According to Minsky (1986), there is an important assymetry here:
loans are granted on the basis of expected proﬁts, while loans are repaid out of realized proﬁts. In
good times, lending institutions tend to reduce their safety margins, and the economy moves towards
a more fragile structure, as outstanding debt cannot eventually be repaid out of realized proﬁts. To
capture and identify this dynamic disproportion between credit growth and real activity quantitatively,
I resort to conditional forecasts from a VAR and view credit booms as departures from business cycle
1Borio and Lowe (2002) also stress the importance of considering multiple time series to detect episodes of ﬁnancial
instability: in particular, they detrend credit-to-GDP ratio and additional variables, e.g. housing prices. My study com-
plements this line of research by explicitly emphasizing the role of endogenous interactions between variables of interest
instead of detrending them separately.
3fundamentals. In particular, when credit growth, justiﬁed by the current state of the business cycle
(and captured by the conditional forecast), is substantially lower than the actual credit growth ob-
served in the economy, this is a signal of a credit boom (vice versa for a credit bust). This approach
therefore allows to detect unsustainable credit expansions without resorting to static credit-to-GDP
ratios and takes endogenous dynamic interactions between relevant variables into account.
On this basis I construct a quantitative criterion and apply it to a set of advanced economies:
the U.S., the Euro Area and Japan for the sample ending in 2009-2010, i.e. the build-up and the un-
winding of ﬁnancial vulnerabilities associated with the Great Recession and ﬁnancial crisis of 2008
can be studied. The chosen countries are advanced economies with different ﬁnancial systems and
different exposure to ﬁnancial distress events, which makes them an interesting test for the method-
ology. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the approach in more detail,
describes the data sets and justiﬁes the choice of econometric methodology. Section 3 discusses the
results for revised and real-time data exercises. These two exercises can be also called ”ex post” and
”ex ante” respectively. In the case of revised data the goal is to test the methodology under ”ideal
conditions” (revised data do not contain real-time errors) and thereby to create a benchmark for more
policy-relevant, real-time analysis. In the ”ex ante” exercise only the vintages of data are used as they
would be available for a policy maker at this point in time. Section 4 examines the robustness of main
ﬁndings, while section 5 concludes and outlines directions for further work.
2 Methodology and Data
Credit booms are usually deﬁned as episodes of particularly rapid growth of credit to the private
sector (Gourinchas et al., 2001). To identify these episodes, time series of credit (real or nominal
credit variables, credit-to-GDP ratios) are decomposed into trend and cyclical component with some
ﬁltering technique (Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter or extended Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter), and a threshold de-
termines when a deviation from trend can be regarded as too large. Consequently, the detection of a
credit boom might depend on the smoothness of the trend (see Mendoza and Terrones (2008) for an
illustration) and on the choise of a particular variable, which is detrended. In contrast to this approach,
I apply a different operational deﬁnition of credit booms seeing them as departures from fundamentals
rather than from their own trend, while business cycle variables are seen as fundamentals for credit.
4When credit growth, justiﬁed by fundamentals (the current state of the business cycle), is substantially
lower than the actual credit growth, this is a signal of a credit boom in the economy (and vice versa
for a credit bust).
Some versions of the threshold method also account for business cycle fundamentals by looking
at credit-to-GDP ratios rather than pure credit variables to determine the phases of the credit cycle.
Despite being an intuitive normalization, credit-to-GDP ratio eliminates valuable information con-
tained in levels of both variables and therefore might produce misleading results. For instance, this
indicator signals a credit boom, when the growth of the ratio is due to the fall in GDP rather than to the
rapid growth in credit (see DellAriccia et al., 2012); such episodes have to be manually eliminated.
I connect the values of credit to business cycle fundamentals by constructing conditional forecasts of
credit, without building ratios to GDP or other real activity measures.
Another potential weakness of the threshold methodology is its univariate approach, which ig-
nores endogenous interactions between variables. Credit booms, however, are general equilibrium
phenomena, therefore it appears reasonable to detect them from multivariate systems rather than sin-
gle time series2. This point is also stressed by Borio and Lowe (2002):”...it is the combination of
events that matters for detecting problems in ﬁnancial stability: it is not just credit growth, or an asset
price boom, the interactions between credit, asset prices and real economy should not be ignored...” I
therefore use a multivariate model - a vector autoregression - as a credit boom detection tool.
On methodological grounds, the benchmark model is close to the one of Giannone, Lenza and
Reichlin (2012), who use a monetary Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) methodology to study
monetary developments in the Euro Area3. Monetary VARs are often used at the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) to conduct monetary analysis in the context of its ”monetary pillar”. The primary
purpose of monetary analysis was to understand implications of monetary developments for price
stability. This approach was often criticized (e.g. Woodford, 2008). However, as the crisis of 2007-
2008 unfolded, the neglect of information contained in money and credit aggregates was seen as a
mistake (see DellAriccia et al., 2012). Monetary analysis was brought into discussion again, but now
the focus was different - ﬁnancial (rather than price) stability. This idea was summarized by Gali
(2010): ”...Paradoxically, the ﬁnancial crisis may end up vindicating the monetary pillar and restoring
its weight in monetary policy analysis. But the resulting pillar is likely to be a highly reconstructed
version of the original one, with a strong emphasis on ﬁnancial stability issues...” This paper employs
2Gourinchas et al. (2001) also point this out in their study.
3Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2012), however, do not construct indicators of atypical behavior.
5monetay VAR to detect episodes of ﬁnancial instability.
I estimate monetary VARs for the U.S., Euro Area and Japan based on the monthly data series
presented in Table 1. Data sources include FRED Database, database of Robert J. Shiller (U.S. stock
Table 1: Data and Data Transformations in the Baseline Monetary VAR: US / Euro Area / Japan
Variable Transformation
Industrial Production (IP) Index/ IP Index / IP Index Log-Level
Consumer Price Index (CPI)/HICP / CPI Log-Level
Federal Funds Rate (FFR)/EONIA / Discount Rate Level
Stock Prices (S&P 500)/EUROSTOXX /MSCI Log-Level
M1/M1/M1 Log-Level
M2/M3/M2 Log-Level
Total Loans and Leases/Total Loans (all maturities)/Domestic Credit Log-Level
prices), ECB-EABCN database, Bank of Japan, and in the case of real-time data for the U.S. - the
database of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. These variables are typically used in monetary
VARs (see Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin, 2012; Banbura et al., 2008) and contain the factors rele-
vant for the purposes of this study: the real economy, asset prices, and monetary variables (credit and
money aggregates). Industrial production captures business cycle activity and will be used as condi-
tioning variable for credit later on; consumer price index captures the price level. Federal Funds Rate,
EONIA and discount rate represent respective short-term interest rates. S &P 500, EUROSTOXX
and MSCI Japan4 capture stock price developments. Monetary block of the VAR consists of narrow
and broad money aggregates as well as credit aggregate. Deﬁnitions of broad money differ across
countries; therefore M2 is used in case of the U.S. and Japan, whereas M3 - in case of Euro Area for
comparability. Total loans represent bank credit to non-ﬁnancial institutions (ﬁrms and households)
the variable of interest to detect a credit boom. All data series are seasonally adjusted. Each region
is estimated separately. The sample size is 1959/1-2010/12 for the U.S., 1970/1-2009/4 for Japan and
1994/1 - 2009/12 for Euro Area. I estimate the VAR in (log)-levels rather than differences in order
not to lose information contained in levels of variables. As noted by Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin
4The coverage of MSCI is very similar to S&P and EUROSTOXX, for the U.S. MSCI and S&P 500 are almost identical.
6(2012), the assessment of level-relationships is particularly important in monetary analysis 5.
The estimation approach is Bayesian rather than classical (”frequentist”), as Bayesian method-
ology contains a useful tool - prior shrinkage - to deal with overﬁtting when estimating densely pa-
rameterized systems (see Canova, 2006). This is an important advantage since the detection of credit
booms (busts) is based on out-of-sample conditional forecasts.
The benchmark model is a linear BVAR, which is estimated in a rolling window approach and
used to generate conditional forecasts for credit. The idea is to use this relatively simple model as a
benchmark for typical interactions of variables and to inspect deviations from this benchmark, thereby
detecting atypical developments.6 In particular, I use the prior of Sims and Zha (1998) which is im-
posed on the structural VAR7 of the form:
p X
l=0
yt lAl = d + t;t = 1;:::;T; (1)
where T is the sample size, yt is the vector of observations, Al is the coefﬁcient matrix of the lth lag,
p is the maximum lag8, d is a vector of constants, and t is a vector of i.i.d. structural Gaussian shocks
with:
E
 
T
t tjyt s;s > 0

= I
E (tjyt s;s > 0) = 0;8t:
Working with multivariate methodology brings many advantages over univariate approaches (si-
multaneity and endogeneity of variables are accounted for by construction), but there are also costs.
5An alternative approach would be to estimate a BVAR in diffrerences as proposed by Villani (2009). However, the
forecasting properties of such models often depend on the assumptions about the steady state of a VAR (see Jarocinski and
Smets, 2008).
6Alternatively to a rolling window, one could proceed with a time-varying parameters approach (e.g. under random walk
assumption) directly. This, however, would only allow to inspect atypical behavior at the end of the sample, whereas the
rolling window approach allows to detect and compare episodes of atypical behavior across time.
7Importantly, although we estimate an identiﬁed VAR under Cholesky identiﬁcation, the ordering of variables does not
affect the distribution of conditional forecasts and therefore is of no relevance for the results. A formal proof of this result
is presented in Waggoner and Zha (1999) (see Proposition 1).
8Following Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2012), I set the maximum lag order to 13 months. This lag structure of
approximately one year is typically used in the literature for monthly data. The rate of decay for the lag order weights is
determined by the prior.
7As already noted above, VARs are densely parameterized systems that are generally prone to overﬁt-
ting, i.e. good in-sample and poor out-of-sample forecasting performance. In Bayesian estimation,
the prior determines the degree of shrinkage, therefore the choice of prior hyperparameters becomes
crucial for the forecasting performance of the model. The trade-off here is as follows. When the prior
is too loose (i.e. very uninformative), the model generates dispersed forecasts due to high estima-
tion uncertainty. When the prior is too tight, estimated coefﬁcients will be very close to prior values,
which is likely to lead to poor forecasts as well. Therefore the goal is to choose the ”right” amount of
shrinkage when one sets the hyperparameters of the prior (see Giannone, Lenza and Primiceri (2012)
and Canova (2006) for more discussion of this argument). Here I follow one of the approaches in the
BVAR literature and obtain the values of prior hyperparameters via maximization of marginal like-
lihood over the training sample. In the case of U.S. the training sample contains 1959/1 - 1973/12,
in the case of Japan - 1970/1 - 1975/129, whereas for Euro Area due to lack of data for the training
sample I resort to values reported in Jarocinski and Mackowiak (2011) who also maximize marginal
likelihood of a Euro Area BVAR under the same prior of Sims and Zha (1998). The values of prior
hyperparameters are presented in Appendix A1.
In the baseline exercise under revised data, conditional forecasts are produced for the horizon of
4 years. Forecast densities are simulated with the Gibbs sampler of Waggoner and Zha (1999) impos-
ing hard conditions10. In what follows point forecasts refer to the mean of the distribution, forecast
bands correspond to the 16-th and 84-th percentiles and pointwise contain 68 % of probability mass.
The VAR is estimated in a rolling window approach, the size of rolling window is 15 years.
After estimating the BVAR up to some point within the sample, I construct conditional out-of-
sample forecasts of credit (conditioned variables are future values of the business cycle proxied by
industrial production) and compare the forecasts with the observed values. Suppose, for instance, the
conditional forecast of credit is substantially lower than its actual (observed) value. It means that the
amount of credit which is consistent with the current state of the business cycle (as captured by the
model forecast) is smaller than what is observed in reality. Conditional on the model, this deviation
indicates that there is more credit in the economy than justiﬁed by the fundamental variable (business
cycle) - a possible indication of a credit boom.
A quantitative deviation criterion captures these ideas as follows. If the actual value of the vari-
able goes out of the probability bands, it is regarded as a substantial deviation. If the actual value stays
9Marginal likelihood is computed as in Chib (1995), optimization is performed via grid search.
10The conditioning algorithm of of Waggoner and Zha (1999) was chosen as it preserves endogeneity.
8within the bands, it is not regarded as a deviation. At each period of time the criterion utilizes fore-
cast information from several estimated rolling windows. They are averaged (forecast pooling), and
forecasts from earlier rolling windows are discounted.11 The forecasts from earlier rolling windows
are utilized in the criterion since they reﬂect the forecasting ability of the model at longer horizons
(longer than one year) and there is no prior reason to favor short-term forecasts to long-term forecasts
in the case of credit.12 Formally, the criterion can be expressed as follows:
critt =
H P
h=1
h(yact
t;h   yb
t;h)
H
; (2)
where H - is the maximum forecast horizon, h is the index for the respective estimation window
(h = 1 corresponds to the latest available value for this point in time t, h = H corresponds to the
value from the earliest estimation window for this point in time). yact
t;h is the actual value of the variable
at time t and estimation window h and yb
t;h is the value of probability band, which was crossed by
the actual value at this point in time and this estimation window13. The interpretation of the criterion
values is straightforward. A positive (negative) value corresponds to the credit boom (bust), whereas
zero stands for no-deviations case. In the next section I apply this methodology to detect atypical
behavior of credit in the U.S., Euro Area, and Japan.
3 Results and Discussion
3.1. Revised Data Analysis
ThecriteriondescribedinprevioussectionisﬁrstappliedtotheU.S.dataontotalloansandleases
(Figure 1). Solid line represents the values of the criterion in the respective month, while dashed lines
depict means of the criterion over the entire sample (this helps distinguishing large deviations from
smaller ones). The largest downward deviations are associated with episodes of ﬁnancial distress
or banking crises: 1989-1991 - consequences of the Savings and Loan Crisis which started in 1984,
1992-1993 - severe recession accompanied by a credit crunch. Large downward deviations correspond
11In particular,  is set to 0.97 in all baseline computations. However, any value between 0:90 and 1 (i.e. no discounting)
delivers very similar results.
12The literature has found evidence in favor of long-run relations envolving credit in the multivariate systems (see Hof-
mann, 2001). However, there appears to be no consensus on the forecasting horizon, at which credit is forecasted best.
13Due to high computational costs (associated especially with Gibbs sampling algorithm) rolling windows have a step of
one year.
9to periods of ﬁnancial distress and are detected contemporaneously. Interestingly, these ﬁndings are
consistent with the results of Bordo et al. (2000), who use quantitative and qualitative criteria and also
characterize these periods as ”moderate” ﬁnancial distress.14 Somewhat smaller downward deviation
is detected around 2000 - 2001, i.e. the years of the dotcom-bubble burst. This episode reﬂects a
rather small downward deviation in credit, which is also consistent with the evidence that the dotcom
bubble appears to have been rather equity-ﬁnanced than credit-ﬁnanced.
[insert Figure 1]
Upward credit deviations were detected in two cases: a smaller deviation around 1996 and a sub-
stantial and persistent deviation in 2003-2007 - the credit boom prior to the Great Recession. Again, in
the case of 1996 deviation, the result is consistent with ﬁndings of Bordo et al. (2000), who describe
this episode as moderate ﬁnancial expansion due to the booming of the stock market and increased
borrowing by households and ﬁrms. The criterion captures these developments as well. Importantly,
the criterion identiﬁes the most recent credit boom several years prior to the outbreak of the Great
Recession in 2007-2008. Notably, here my ﬁndings are different from Mendoza and Terrones (2008),
who identify a credit boom in 1999 and do not identify excessive credit growth prior to the Great
Recession. I discuss possible reasons for these differences below.
The analysis for Euro Area is limited to the Great Recession episode due to data availability. The
ﬁndings are similar to the case of the U.S.: a persistent and substantial upward deviation i.e. credit
boom is detected in 2004-2007 (Figure 2). Again, this warning comes in advance.
[insert Figure 2]
In the case of Japan (Figure 3) downward deviations in the credit indicator also correspond to
the episodes of ﬁnancial distress or crises: 1989-1991 - burst of the asset price bubble accompanied
by a substantial credit contraction. Later in 1996-1998, Japan has expereinced a systemic banking
crisis followed by a credit crunch, which is also detected by the criterion15. As for the upward devi-
14Financial distress in these episodes is labeled by Bordo et al. (2000) ”moderate” as their sample period also contains
the Great Depression of 1930s, which serves as a benchmark for severe ﬁnancial distress.
15The wave of bankruptsies among ﬁnancial institutions in Japan has already started in the middle of 1995, when several
credit cooperatives and a regional bank were closed. In 1997 several large proﬁle ﬁnancial institutions (e.g. Hokkaido
Takushoku Bank) went bancrupt (see Kanaya and Woo (2000) for a detailed overview of those events).
10ations, the largest is observed in 1986-1989 - credit boom preceding the asset price collapse in 1990.
Smaller and much less persistent upward deviations are detected in 1995 as well as in 2000-2001,
both episodes occur in the expansionary or peak phase of the Japanese business cycle.
[insert Figure 3]
The credit boom detection literature has stressed the nexus between credit booms and asset price
booms. Borio and Lowe (2002) ﬁnd that swings in asset prices (especially housing prices) tend to go
hand in hand with the cycles of credit expansion. Figures 4-6 plot the criterion for asset price indices
used in the baseline VAR (MSCI, Eurostoxx and S&P respectively). Indeed, many of the credit boom
episodes overlap with atypical upward behavior of asset price indices: Japanese credit and asset price
boom in late 1980s (see Figure 4), smaller Japanese expansionary episodes in 1995 and 2001; Euro
Area credit boom prior to the Great Recession (Figure 5). For the U.S., however, only two of credit
expansions (in 1996 and in 2004-2007) are associated with rather moderate upward atypical behavior
in S&P index (see Figure 6). The largest boom in asset price index, however, occurred in 1999-2000,
which was subsequently followed by a large bust in 2001 (the burst of the dotcom bubble). This
episode is, however, not associated with substantial deviations in credit: dotcom-bubble was largely
equity-ﬁnanced. A weaker nexus between asset price boom and credit boom of the 2004-2007 in the
U.S. is understandable as well, since the asset price measure does not relate to housing prices.16
This example shows that atypical credit expansions are indeed often associated with asset price
booms. However, the types of assets linked to credit cycles may differ across countries and time.
Another important question besides timely identiﬁcation of credit booms is the question about
their nature. Here I consider one of the hypotheses referring to the building of credit booms in a low
interest rate environment. There are several theoretical explanations for this effect. The ”search for
yield” hypothesis (see Borio and Zhu, 2008) suggests that bank managers may engage in excessive
lending and risk-taking activities to achieve nominal revenue targets. Another explanation refers to
”income and valuation effects” (see Adrian and Shin, 2010; Adrian, Moench and Shin, 2010).
The necessary condition for the above hypotheses to be at work is abnormally low short-term
interest rate. Indeed, in the business cycle conditioning exercise I ﬁnd downward deviation of policy
interest rates around the credit boom episode in the 2000s for the U.S. (Figure 7). As shown on Figure
16Housing price indices for the U.S. are available only for a part of the sample and at quarterly frequency from the BIS
property price database.
117, in early 2000s the interest rate stay at too low values from November 2001 to August 2004. Note-
worthy, Taylor (2007) also shows that the Federal Funds rate deviated from the Taylor rule downwards
in 2002 Q2 - 2006 Q2. Can credit boom be explained by the atypically low interest rates?
[insert Figure 7]
To test it, I perform a conditioning exercise with the monetary policy rate (the Federal Funds rate
in the U.S., EONIA in the Euro Area, and discount rate for Japan) instead of the business cycle vari-
able. Now conditional forecasts of credit can be seen as amounts of credit consistent with the current
stance of monetary policy (rather than with the business cycle, as was done before). The results show
that, indeed, the size of upward deviations prior to the crisis 2007 is substantially reduced in this case.
Figure 8 illustrates this ﬁnding for the U.S. credit variable. On the left panel of Figure 8, where the
forecasts are conditioned on the business cycle, the model systematically underestimates the actual
credit growth rates at all forecast horizons. The only change on the right panel is that the conditioning
variable is the Federal Funds rate; the model is estimated over the same rolling window as on the left
panel. However, now the gap between conditional forecasts and observed values decreases substan-
tially so that in many periods actual values fall within the forecast bands. It is certainly also reﬂected
in the values of the criterion, which are substantially reduced now.17
[insert Figure 8]
Results for Euro Area credit boom in early 2000s are qualitatively similar. As for Japan, con-
ditioning on the short-term rate does not help explaining the credit boom in 1986-1989, as Figure 9
illustrates.
[insert Figure 9]
One should not, however, overestimate the role of monetary policy in the credit boom episodes
of early 2000s in the U.S. and Euro Area. As Figure 10 illustrates, low monetary policy rates deliver
17Importantly, the values of downward deviations (not shown), which were associated with banking crises and credit
crunch in the 1980s and early 1990s, were not affected by the change of the conditioning variable from the IP index to the
Federal Funds rate by much.
12only a partial explanation of the credit boom, as atypical behavior of credit cannot be eliminated com-
pletely, as the criterion still remains positive even under the interest rate conditioning. There exist
additional factors driving excessive lending behavior and excessive risk taking of commercial banks
during credit booms (e.g. moral hazard or inappropriate micro- and macroprudential regulation). Test-
ing these factors, however, requires a structural model and goes beyond the scope of this paper.
[insert Figure 10]
3.2. Real-Time Exercise (U.S.)
Previous section of the paper demonstrated that credit booms and busts are detectable under the
”ideal conditions” of revised data. When conditioning on the future path of the business cycle variable
(the IP), I used future values of the revised IP series. Furthermore, the data for all the other variables in
the VAR also contained revisions. However, actual decision making occurs in real time, when data (if
available at all) contain errors which can only be corrected later. Therefore now I turn to an exercise
with real-time data to see if atypical behavior of credit can be revealed under these conditions. The
analysis of this section is performed for the U.S. economy (for reasons of data availability).
I use real-time data set of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia for the U.S. (see Appendix
A2 for description of data series). Four variables in the baseline monetary VAR are subject to revi-
sions: industrial production, concumer prices (CPI), M1 and M2 monetary aggregates. To understand
the magnitude of the revisions, I compute growth rates for these variables based on revised data from
the FRED database as well as based on the respective vintages from the real-time data set. Figure 11
illustrates the size of real-time misperceptions, which are measured as the difference between the real-
time growth rate and revised growth rate. As we can see, the biggest revisions occur in the IP series18,
whereas the revisions in monetary aggregates and especially the CPI are rather small. These large
revisions in the IP series might considerably affect the results as business cycle variable inﬂuences
in-sample estimation of the BVAR as well as (pseudo) out-of sample forecasting exercise, where it is
used as conditioning variable.
[insert Figure 11]
18Thisfactisnotsurprising. Problemswithcorrectlyestimatingtheoutputgapinrealtimearewell-knownintheliterature
(see Orphanides and Wieland (2013) for a recent discussion).
13To study atypical behavior of credit in real-time a (pseudo) nowcasting exercise is conducted. I
use the data which are the latest available at a certain point in time, then step one year back and esti-
mate the VAR with this data. Then I perform the conditional forecast exercise (nowcast) for the last
year of available data and compute the deviation criterion as in formula (2). Due to lack of comparable
real-time data I have to start the analysis in 1994 (see Appendix A2 for details on data availability).
Figure 12 plots the criterion values for loans in real time. Similar to the analysis with revised
data, downward episode around 2001 is detected, so are upward episode in 1996 and credit boom prior
to the Great Recession. Even though the signals now appear somewhat noisier than under revised data,
the direction and timing of deviations are the same as in the revised data analysis and therefore robust.
[insert Figure 12]
3.3. Comparison with Univariate Detrending Methodologies
In this section I compare my results with those, obtained using univariate detrending methodologies.
I will illustrate the main differences on the example of the U.S., although the same logic carries over
to Japan and Euro Area. The main ﬁndings are summarized in Table 2, which lists the episodes and
the direction and strength (size) of deviations in the credit variable.
First, I compare the results with univariate detrending of the credit variable (nominal credit, for
comparability with the VAR19), where the trend is determined over the entire sample (second row in
Table 2).20. The most striking differences appear in 1991-1994, where a moderate boom is detected
instead of the bust (credit crunch), and in 2004-2007, where no substantial deviations can be detected.
Credit boom preceding the Great Recession is detected in 2008-2009, i.e. after the onset of the reces-
sion. The reason for these outcomes is very likely the use of the entire sample for trend computation.
For instance, in the boom episode of 2004-2007, credit is constantly growing in line with the strong
upward trend, therefore the deviations from trend appear small in those years. Consequently, univari-
ate methodology does not detect a boom. Only in recession, already in 2008-2009, when the trend
reverts and starts declining (accounting for lower credit growth in the following years), the upward
deviations from trend become evident. Therefore this credit boom is detected later.21 Based on this
evidence, rolling window approach appears to be more favorable.
19Detrending of real credit yields nearly identical results to detrending of nominal credit for the U.S.
20A similar approach was used by Mendoza and Terrones (2008)
21This goes in line with the ﬁndings of Mendoza and Terrones (2008), who do not detect a credit boom in the U.S. on the
sample ending in 2006.
14Table 2: Credit Boom Detection in the U.S.: Comparison of Methodologies
Methodology 1987-1989 1991-1994 1996 2004-2007 2008-2009
Monetary VAR
moderate
bust
big bust
moderate
boom
big boom -
Detrending of
nominal credit
(entire sample)
-
moderate
boom
moderate
boom
- big boom
Detrending of
nominal credit
normalized with IP
(entire sample)
moderate
boom
moderate
boom
moderate
boom
- big boom
Detrending of
nominal credit
normalized with IP
(rolling sample)
moderate
bust
boom
followed by
bust
moderate
boom
moderate
boom
big boom
Second, univariate threshold methodologies are usually applied for credit variables normalized
to real activity (e.g. credit-to-GDP ratios). As I use monthly data, I rescale credit by the industrial
production index instead of GDP, which only becomes available at quarterly frequency. I apply de-
trending to this variable, ﬁrst determining the trend over the entire sample (third row in Table 2). The
use of the normalized credit variable complicates the detection of credit booms further, as the ratio
mistakenly signals a credit boom during recessions, e.g. in 1991-1994, when a credit crunch actually
occured. As industrial production drops faster than the credit variable, credit normalized by real ac-
tivity increases, therefore generating a positive deviation from trend. The boom of 2004-2007 is again
detected later due to two factors: detrending over the entire sample and rapid increase of credit to real
activity ratio in the Great Recession.
Finally, I perform rolling window detrending of credit normalized by real activity (see the last
row of Table 2).22 This approach yields the results that are much closer to the VAR approach: the
22This approach is quite close to the one of Borio and Lowe (2002). Borio and Lowe (2002), however, use annual data
for credit-to-GDP ratios and compute cumulative deviations from trend. In line with the cumulative approach, I regard the
15direction of the deviations is now mostly the same, although there are some differences in timing. In
particular, in the most recent boom episode prior to the Great Recession, univariate detecting is some-
what delayed: the credit boom around the Great Recession still has its peak in 2008-2009, whereas
upward deviations in 2004-2007 are rather small.23
Summing up, univariate detrending may generate misleading results, when the trend is deter-
mined over the entire sample and when ratios of credit to real activity are used. In this case, even
under rolling window approach, the peak of the credit boom may be delayed to recession years, when
real activity drops rapidly. Under these circumstances, the multivariate approach accounting for busi-
ness cycle fundamentals without forming the ratios, appears to perform better.
3.4. Atypical Behavior of Money
Using a monetary VAR, it is straightforward to study atypical behavior of money; this question
has also become a subject of academic discussion in the aftermath of the Great Recession. One of
the reasons is empirical: prior to the crisis of 2007-2008 large swings in broad money growth were
observed in many advanced economies, including the U.S. and Euro Area (Figure 13). In particu-
lar, period of accelerating growth rates prior to the crisis was followed by an abrupt and remarkable
fall in growth rates, as the crisis unfolded. This latter fall in money growth was so substantial that
it called analogies to downward dynamics observed during the Great Depression 24. Furthermore,
several recent contributions investigate the role of monetary aggregates as uncertainty indicator (see
e.g. Cronin and Kennedy, 2007). Finally, on theoretical grounds, the research of De Santis (2012)
shows that there exists a stable relation between broad money and asset prices. Therefore atypical
movements in money might reﬂect the stage of the ﬁnancial cycle. Little is known about empirical
properties of money as ﬁnancial instability indicator. The question is, whether monetary aggregates
can provide additional useful information to the one already contained in credit aggregates. I inspect
this question in what follows.
deviations as substantial, when they occur several periods in a row.
23I also examined rolling detrending of non-normalized credit variables (nominal and real credit). The results around the
Great Recession episode become more similar to those from the VAR, but the results in earlier episodes differ and become
sensitive to trend smoothing parameter.
24Giannone, Lenza, Pill and Reichlin (2011) conduct a detailed comparison of these two episodes and show that the
fall of money growth in 1930s was much more severe and was accompanied by a fundamentally different monetary policy
response.
16[insert Figure 13]
I apply the criterion from formula (2) to broad money aggregates of the U.S., Euro Area, and
Japan (see Figures 14, 15 and 16 respectively). The ﬁrst remarkable ﬁnding is the absence of atypical
downward behavior of monetary aggregates at the outset of the Great Recession in 2007-2008 in both
the U.S. and Euro Area. This ﬁnding ﬁrst appears surprising given the magnitude of the fall of money
growth rates (Figure 13). However, as the criterion illustrates, this downward movement is a reﬂection
of the business cycle (recession) in both the U.S. and Euro Area and is quite well forecasted by the
model. It is the upward pre-crisis development (2003-2007) in money growth that is atypical, not its
downturn afterwards.
[insert Figures 14, 15 and 16]
The second ﬁnding is that atypical behavior of broad money occurs largely in the same episodes
as atypical behavior of credit. It applies to both upward and downward deviations in all three regions
analyzed.25 Both money and credit aggregates indicate an excessive growth in 2002(4)-2006(7), prior
to the Great Recession. There are only some minor differences in the timing: the money boom in the
U.S. started and ended about one year earlier than the respective credit boom. The timings of money
and credit booms largely coincide in Japan and Euro Area. To sum up, the revised data analysis shows
that atypical behavior of monetary aggregates mostly resembles the one of credit.
The results for real-time data are depicted on Figure 17 (U.S. case). There are many similarities
with the revised data analysis (Figure 14). There is again a downward deviation around 1994 asso-
ciated with the consequences of the severe recession and credit crunch in the 1990s. The prolonged
episode of excessive money growth prior to the Great Recession is also present here. However, the
timing is rather different: the boom starts already in 2002 (and not in 2004). Furthermore, there is
a sizable downward deviation in 2004, which sends a wrong signal. To sum up, the performance of
money based indicator deteriorates in real time quite substantially.
[insert Figure 17]
25In the case of the U.S. monetary aggregate does not exhibit atypical behavior around the dotcom bubble episode in 2001
and in the moderate expansion in 1996-1997, whereas credit does.
174 Robustness
Findings are conditional on the baseline model and the assumptions of the forecasting exercise.
Therefore, in this section I test how sensitive the results are to the main assumptions. Baseline VAR
speciﬁcation contains only few aggregated variables, and one has to inspect if the results change when
additional variables are included. In the case of U.S. I perform baseline forecasting exercise (revised
data) on the extended monetary VAR (see Table 3 for description of variables).
In this exercise I again condition on industrial production business cycle fundamental.26 The
Table 3: Data and Data Transformations in the Extended Monetary VAR (U.S.)
Variable Transformation
Industrial Production Log-Level
Consumer Price Index (CPI) Log-Level
Unemployment Rate Level
Producer Price Index (PPI) Log-Level
Federal Funds Rate (FFR) Level
Oil Price Log-Level
Stock Prices (S & P 500 composite) Log-Level
1 Year Bond Rate Level
3 Years Bond Rate Level
5 Years Bond Rate Level
10 Years Bond Rate Level
M1 Log-Level
MZM Log-Level
M2 Log-Level
Commercial and Industrial Loans (C & I) Log-Level
Real Estate Loans Log-Level
Consumer Loans Log-Level
Prime Loan Rate Level
26The results, however, are very similar when I condition on both business cycle indicators - industrial production and
unemployment rate - simultaneously.
18ﬁrst goal of this exercise is to check whether the addition of further variables alters the quality and
timing of atypical behavior for the variables, which are common in baseline and extended VAR. This
is generally not the case (see Figure 18 for an illustration for M2 money aggregate), i.e. the results
in the baseline do not seem to be driven by the omitted variable bias, when the set of variables is
extended and includes time series typically used in large monetary BVARs (see Banbura et al., 2009).
[insert Figure 18]
Furthermore, the extended VAR allows studying atypical behavior of various categories of credit
in more detail. Here I include real estate loans, commercial and industrial loans and consumer loans,
which taken together account for about 90 % of total loans and leases in the U.S. in 1960-2010 (see
Appendix A3 for the deﬁnitions of these loan categories). The criterion values for real estate loans are
depicted on Figure 19. The main ﬁndings are in line with those of the aggregate credit measure, e.g.
there is a bust in lending in early 1990s and build-up of excessive credit prior to the Great Recession.
There is, however, one important difference - a substantial bust (the biggest in the entire sample) in
real estate lending during and after the Great Recession of 2008. This example shows that it is also
useful to apply the criterion to disaggregated credit measures to obtain additional information that
would be hidden in the aggregate picture.
Indeed, when looking at the aggregate credit measure (see Figure 1), this credit contraction at
the end of sample is not observed, because other credit components (C&I loans and consumer loans)
do not exhibit such an abrupt fall as real estate lending and more so they even grow (see Figure 20).
Growth of C&I loans in recession years 2008-2009 and afterwards has been subject of concern for
regulatory authorities (see Duke, 2012). The drop in real estate lending is likely to have contributed
to the growth of other lending activities, especially C&I lending, as banks are willing to generate loan
volume without resorting to real estate lending. Duke (2012) mentions that aggressive competition
for C&I loans has started after the Great Recession and that it might potentially lead to deterioration
of lending standards and excessive unsustainable lending in this sector. The criterion supports this hy-
pothesis revealing substantial upward deviations in C&I lending in 2008-2010. The other deviations
in C&I criterion are plausible as well, mainly supporting the conclusions of aggregate credit measure
analysis. The credit crunch in early 1990s and credit expansion in 1996 are revealed again. There is
an additional bust episode after the burst of the dotcom bubble and recession in 2001, which is rea-
sonable, as corporate lending was perceived riskier after the burst of the bubble and banks decreased
19this type of lending activities for some time (this situation is similar to the bust in real estate lending
after the Great Recession described above).
Consumer lending criterion 27 delivers results that are somewhat similar to C&I criterion, detect-
ing credit crunch in early 1990s and moderate expansion in 1996 as well as substantial expansion in
the years after the Great Recession. However, there are also substantial bust episodes around 1999 and
2005. These results should be interpreted with caution: in contrast to C&I loans, industrial production
may not be the appropriate fundamental for consumer credit. 28
All in all, the analysis of the extended model shows that disaggregated credit measures support
the main ﬁndings of the analysis with the aggregate measure and also deliver additional valuable in-
formation. One has, however, to be cautious when choosing fundamentals for different types of credit:
although being applicable to the aggregate credit measures, the same fundamentals may become in-
appropriate for certain types of credit activities.
I further test the robustness with respect to the values of prior hyperparameters. As expected,
imposing looser priors leads to a substantial worsening of the overall forecasting performance of the
model (the amount of shrinkage is further away from optimum), i.e. there are now generally more
deviation episodes than under a tighter prior. However, the deviations detected with tighter priors
remain the largest in size under loose priors.
Many studies operate with real credit measures to detect credit booms: Mendoza and Terrones
(2008) use real credit per capita as benchmark measure of credit, while Gourinchas et al. (2001) use
credit-to-GDP ratio. Furthermore, Mendoza and Terrones (2008) argue that credit boom detection
methodologies should be robust to the credit measure used. Therefore I conduct the baseline exercise
for the U.S. using real credit per capita as credit measure. Overall the results remain qualitatively
similar to the benchmark case. All the big deviation episodes (such as credit bust in early 1990s,
expansion in 1996 and credit boom prior to the Great Recession) are still robustly detected. Only the
moderate contractionary episode around 2000 appears less important under the real measure.29
Finally, I test the robustness of all speciﬁcations with respect to the size of rolling window (10
27These results are available upon request.
28It might appear somewhat surprising that no credit crunch is detected in both C&I and consumer loans in the years of
the Great Recession. The data suggest, however, that there was none. This is also in line with empirical evidence reported
in Chari et al. (2008), who show that a credit crunch in these types of loans appears to be one of the myths of the Great
Recession.
29These results are available upon request.
20years, 20 years, 25 years). The size of the rolling window does not signiﬁcantly affect the results.
5 Conclusions and Further Work
This paper develops a criterion to detect episodes of atypical behavior of credit and tests it for the
U.S., Euro Area, and Japan. In contrast to the threshold methodology, the approach is multivariate and
explicitly takes endogenous interactions of variables into account. The proposed approach identiﬁes
credit booms as departures from fundamentals and allows detecting credit booms without resorting to
univariate detrending procedures and credit-to-GDP ratios, thereby avoiding the problem of spurious
credit boom identiﬁcation.
The analysis under revised data shows that downward credit deviations are associated with pe-
riods of ﬁnancial distress and/or banking crises. Upward deviations are associated with episodes of
credit booms, notably, credit boom prior to the Great Recession in the U.S. and Euro Area as well as
credit boom preceding the burst of the asset price bubble in Japan in 1986 -1989. Interestingly, credit
boom episode in early 2000s can be to some extent explained by abnormally low policy rates in the
U.S. and Euro Area. This ﬁnding gives some support to the hypothesis of excessive lending of banks
in a low interest rate environment. Short interest rates alone cannot, however, eliminate excessive
atypical behavior of credit completely, which indicates that other factors explaining this phenomenon
are still to be explored.
Money booms are often reﬂections of credit booms. These ﬁndings hold for all regions and are
quite robust. In real time, however, the performance of money-based indicator deteriorates substan-
tially: signals become noisier and might even point in the wrong direction.
There are still many open questions to be answered in future work. First, more has to be learned
about the nature of credit deviations from its fundamentals. Low monetary policy rates seem to de-
liver only a partial explanation. Second, it is still unclear, how policy should respond to credit booms
once they are detected. An open question remains, whether monetary policy can reduce unsustainable
credit growth by tightening interest rates and whether this task should be better delegated to macro-
prudential policy instead. A structural model would be better suited to address these questions. Third,
it would be interesting to test the proposed criterion for other countries, especially emerging market
economies, which have experienced several credit boom episodes in the 1980s and 1990s. Finally,
even though the analysis proves quite robust in real time, it is nevertheless desirable to make it even
21less prone to misperceptions contained in real-time data. I leave these questions for future work.
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Figure 1: Criterion Values for Total Loans and Leases (U.S.).: positive values indicate atypical credit
expansions, negative values indicate atypical credit contractions.
1987-1989 - credit bust following Savings and Loans crisis, 1991-1994 - credit crunch; 1996 - ”mod-
erate ﬁnancial expansion” (in terminology of Bordo et al. 2000), 2004-2007 - credit boom prior to the
Great Recession.
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Figure 2: Criterion Values for Total Loans and Leases (Euro Area): positive values indicate atypical
credit expansions, negative values indicate atypical credit contractions.
The duration of the recession is set according to the dates of the Euro Area Business Cycle Dating
Committee.
2004-2008 - credit boom prior to the Great Recession.
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Figure 3: Criterion Values for Domestic Credit (Japan): positive values indicate atypical credit expan-
sions, negative values indicate atypical credit contractions.
The duration of the recessions is set according to the dates reported by McAdam (2007) and Altug
and Bildirici (2010), who use Markov switching methodology to detect business cycle turning points
in Japan.
1986-1989 - credit boom; 1990-1994 - credit bust associated with the burst of the asset price bubble;
1995 - moderate ﬁnancial expansion; 1996 -1998 - systemic banking crisis and credit crunch; 2000 -
moderate ﬁnancial expansion.
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Figure 4: Criterion Values for MSCI (Japan): positive values indicate atypical expansions, negative
values indicate atypical contractions.
The circled episodes overlap with atypical credit expansions.
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Figure 5: Criterion Values for Eurostoxx (Euro Area): positive values indicate atypical expansions,
negative values indicate atypical contractions.
The circled episode overlaps with atypical credit expansion.
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Figure 6: Criterion Values for S&P 500 (U.S.): positive values indicate atypical expansions, negative
values indicate atypical contractions.
The circled episodes overlap with atypical credit expansions.
311984/1 1988/1 1992/1 1996/1 2000/1 2004/1 2008/1
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
x 10
-3 FFR criterion
 
 
NBER recessions
criterion
+mean
-mean
Figure 7: Criterion Values for the Federal Funds Rate (U.S.).
Circled episode indicates the period of atypically low policy rate preceding the credit boom of 2004-
2007.
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Figure 8: Credit Forecasts for 2004-2007 in the US: Conditioned on the industrial production (left
panel) and on the Federal Funds Rate (right panel)
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Figure 9: Criterion for Domestic Credit in Japan in the 1986-1989 Boom Episode: IP Conditioning
vs. Short-Term Rate Conditioning
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Figure 10: Criterion for U.S. Loans in the 2004-2007 Boom Episode: IP Conditioning vs. Short-Term
Rate Conditioning
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Figure 11: Real-Time Misperceptions in Growth Rates of industrial production (IP) index, consumer
price index (CPI), narrow money (M1), and broad money (M2) in the U.S.
Misperception is deﬁned as a difference between the real-time growth rate and revised growth rate.
Figure 12: Criterion Values Under IP Conditioning for Loans (US): Real-Time Analysis.
Positive values indicate atypical credit expansions, negative values indicate atypical credit contrac-
tions.
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Figure 13: Growth of Broad Money in Euro Area and in the US in 2003-2010, in percent
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Figure 14: Criterion Values for M2 (US): positive values indicate atypical money expansions, negative
values indicate atypical money contractions.
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Figure 15: Criterion Values for M3 (Euro Area): positive values indicate atypical money expansions,
negative values indicate atypical money contractions.
The duration of the recession is set according to the dates of the Euro Area Business Cycle Dating
Committee.
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Figure 16: Criterion Values for M2 (Japan): positive values indicate atypical money expansions,
negative values indicate atypical money contractions.
The duration of the recessions is set according to the dates reported by McAdam (2007) and Altug
and Bildirici (2010), who use Markov switching methodology to detect business cycle turning points
in Japan.
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Figure 17: Criterion Values Under IP Conditioning for M2 (US), Real-Time Analysis: positive values
indicate atypical money expansions, negative values indicate atypical money contractions.
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Figure 18: Criterion Values for M2 in the Extended Monetary VAR (US): positive values indicate
atypical money expansions, negative values indicate atypical money contractions.
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Figure 19: Criterion Values for Real Estate Loans in the Extended Monetary VAR (US): positive
values indicate atypical expansions, negative values indicate atypical contractions.
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Figure 20: Criterion Values for Commercial and Industrial Loans in the Extended Monetary VAR
(US): positive values indicate atypical expansions, negative values indicate atypical contractions.
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A1. Selection of Prior Hyperparameters
Prior Hyperparameter Values for U.S., Euro Area and Japan (Sims and Zha (1998) prior)
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6
US 0.6 0.1 0.1 1 5 5
Euro Area 0.1 1 2 1 1 1
Japan 0.8 0.1 0.2 1 2 2
In the Table above, 1 measures overall tightness, 2 determines relative tightness of au-
toregressive coefﬁcients, while 3 determines relative tightness of the constants. 4 is the lag decay
parameter, 5 and 6 stand for ”one-unit-root” and ”no-cointergration” priors respectively (see Sims
and Zha (1998)).
A2. Real-Time Data Set
In the exercise with real-time data we rely on the dataset of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
Out of 7 variables in the baseline VAR, there are four, which are subject to regular revisions:
 Industrial Production Index: monthly observations from the real-time data set of the Philadel-
phia Fed. To estimate a 15 year rolling window ending in (for instance) December 1983, we
have to rely on the monthly vintage of January 1984;
 M1 and M2 aggregates: monthly observations from the real-time data set of the Philadelphia
Fed. To estimate a 15 year rolling window ending in (for instance) December 1983, we have
to rely on the monthly vintage of second quarter 1984 (February), as M1 and M2 vintages are
available at quarterly frequency.
 Consumer Price Index: monthly observations from the real-time data set of the Philadelphia
Fed. Vintages are available at quarterly frequency starting from Q3 1994.
Federal Funds effective rate, S &P 500 index and loans are not revised.
43A3. Loan Categories in the Extended VAR
 Real estate loans include all loans backed by commercial or residential real estate.
 Consumer loans cover most short- and intermediate-term credit extended to individuals. They
include revolving credit (credit card and credit balances outstanding on unsecured revolving
lines of credit) and nonrevolving credit (secured and unsecured credit for automobiles, mobile
homes, trailers, durable goods, vacations and other purposes). Consumer credit excludes loans
secured by real estate (mortgage loans, home equity loans and home equity lines of credit); the
latter are covered by the category ”Real Estate Loans”.
 Commercial and industrial (C&I) lending includes loans to corporations, commercial en-
terprises or joint ventures that are not maintained in real estate or consumer installment loan
portfolios. C&I loans are typically made in the form of a seasonal or working-capital loan, term
business loan or loan to an individual for a business purpose.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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